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Abstract 
The arena of mobile telecommunication in Europe has undergone a technological 
transition from analogue (first generation) to digital (second generation) technologies. 
While this transition is immediately attributable to shifts in demand and supply 
patterns, closer examination reveals that there are numerous other intervening factors 
that have facilitated this transition. This paper utilizes a conceptual framework for 
institutional analysis developed in earlier work to identify and discuss some of these 
factors. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications from this study for 
an institutional perspective on technological change. 
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1. Introduction 
By the mid 1990s the Global System for Mobile Telecommunications (GSM) group 
of technologies had become almost fully established in Europe while making 
important inroads into other markets.1 In 1995 GSM had more than 21 million 
subscribers in 133 networks operating in more than 105 countries. The daily average 
for new subscribers in the same year was put at 50,000. Given the historical pattern of 
dominance in the information and communication technology (ICT) market by the US 
and Japanese firms, GSM represented a major coup for the European economy as a 
whole as the main beneficiary. The uptake of GSM was perhaps most notable in 
Nordic countries and Italy. In 1999 Finland was reported to have 45.6 subscribers per 
100 inhabitants, Norway 38.4, Sweden 35.8, Denmark 27.5, Iceland 24, and Italy 
20.1. The existence of a large and rapidly growing market for GSM in Nordic 
countries was matched by the strong performance of Nordic producers of 
telecommunications equipment who led the production of equipment conforming to 
GSM standards. Both Ericsson (Sweden) and Nokia (Finland) played quite central 
roles in developing GSM. Motorola (US) and Siemens (Germany) have maintained a 
presence while Japanese multinationals represent the third rank of competitors. 
Hommen and Mannimen (2003) underline centralized control by the European 
Commission through setting up the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) as one of the main reasons for the success of GSM. The rationale for the 
Commission’s central control is said to have been the realization that instituting a 
harmonized market would require powers beyond what could be mustered by the 
traditional (national) public telephone operators and telephone and telegraph 
operators. The ETSI’s mandate was to harmonize the growingly diverse mobile 
telecommunication market in Europe. Later ETSI also played a central role in 
providing access to the African, Asian, Australasian, and the Middle Eastern markets 
for European manufacturers. A notable difference in the approach taken by ETSI to 
fulfill its mandate was the involvement of both manufacturers and operators in the 
processes of standard making and regulation of the market. 
It is widely accepted that the intervention by the European Commission in the mobile 
telecommunication market played a central role in facilitating the shift from first 
                                                 
1 This brief history is based on an extensive study conducted by Hommen and Minnenan (2003). 
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generation analogue technologies to second generation digital technologies. There is, 
however, insufficient detail on the context within which this transition occurred. 
Utilizing a conceptual framework for institutional analysis developed in earlier work 
(Parto 2003) this paper identifies and elaborates on the role of other, perhaps less 
tangible but nevertheless important, factors that contributed to this transition. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the implications from this study for an 
institutional perspective on technological change. The next section reconceptualizes 
technological transitions to underline the role of institutions in transitions from one 
technological regime to the next. The third, fourth, and fifth sections develop the 
conceptual components of the framework for institutional analysis by making the 
links between institutions and economic activity (section 3), devising a typology of 
institutions (section 4), and making the link between learning and socio-economic 
change from an institutionalist perspective (section 5) while the sixth section applies 
the framework to the case of GSM. The final section discusses the findings and the 
implications of the approach adopted in this paper for conducting institutional 
analysis.  
2. Technological Transitions and Institutions 
Broadly viewed, society is a configuration of norms, forms, rules, and practices and a 
community of rule followers with distinctive socio-cultural ties and connections. 
There are in addition inter-subjective understandings based on shared codes of 
meaning and ways of reasoning, and senses of belonging (Olsen 2000). As an 
evolutionary change a “transition” (Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt 2001), or a 
fundamental structural change, such that the mode of production or materials flow in 
the economy is significantly and irreversibly reconstituted, requires persistent external 
attractors and responsive internal actors over time to mould the new “instituted 
process” born of a combination and recombination of old and new institutions to 
generate new forms, rules, and practices to be adhered to by the rule followers. 
A technological transition is said to occur when a new (significantly different) 
dynamic equilibrium is reached (Rotmans et al. 2001). The concept of transition is 
firmly rooted in the development of complex systems (Nicolis and Prigogine 1989) 
consistent with which under certain conditions, open systems with a gradient across 
their boundaries will move away from equilibrium and will establish new stable 
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structures (Kay 1994). The development of complex systems is characterized by 
phases of rapid organization leading to steady states, which after a period of relative 
calm move toward rapid reorganization to constitute a new steady state. Stability in a 
dynamic equilibrium is indicated through presence of clearly identifiable structures, 
routines, and repetitions whose confluence increases the predictability of occurrence 
of certain future events or activities. 
The process of change in a dynamic equilibrium is indicated by weakened structures, 
breakdown in routines and diminished repetition and predictability. If change-making 
factors persist and continue to gain strength, structural changes begin to emerge in the 
subsystem through an accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological, and 
institutional changes. During this phase of transition there are collective learning 
processes, social and technical innovations, diffusion, and embedding all leading to a 
reduction in the speed of change and the institutionalization of new structures, 
routines, and behaviours – indicating that the subsystem has stabilized and reached a 
new dynamic equilibrium. The relative stability of the new equilibrium is in part 
evidenced through changes in and movements among different types of institution. As 
a result of the newfound stability, new forms of associative institutions such as 
business networks, or significant changes in the functions of existing networks, begin 
to emerge; new or modified habits and routines become established at the individual, 
organizational, and societal levels of inter-relation; significant changes in fundamental 
values and formal structures can be noted; and, a proliferation of prescriptions and 
proscriptions enters discourse on how the society as a whole should respond to 
change. It may thus be concluded changes in any subsystem of the economy can only 
meaningfully be studied as being embedded in an institutional context. This 
generalization is qualified in the next section. 
3. Economic Activity and Institutions 
Much of the analysis claiming recognition of the importance of institutions in 
economic activity does little more than throwing in institutions as an add-on “factor” 
or a “filter” to be accounted for in schematics representing causal flows in a given 
situation. A popular tendency is to view institutions as constraints that bear upon a 
“non-institutional” economy or market, failing to see economies and markets as 
collections of institutions (Hodgson 1999a: 145). The main characteristic of the 
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institution is the “permanency” or “invariability” relative to the individual as a unit of 
analysis (Hodgson 1988, 1999a). “The institution” is therefore more akin to spatial 
and temporal inquiry than “the individual” with a fixed set of preferences (Williamson 
1994). The focus by some economists on “the institution” represents a significant 
departure from the standard rational choice theory of neoclassical economics. This 
renewed focus on institutions underlines the importance of such factors as culture in 
determining economic actors’ operative goals, values, and views of the choice context 
insofar as actions involve coordination with or will induce responses from other actors 
(Nelson 1994:130, Jessop 2000). 
TABLE 1 
Yet there is a startlingly wide range of definitions and descriptions for “institution” 
and “institutions”, rendering the task of accounting for institutions operationally 
challenging. There is reasonable unanimity among institutionalists as to the 
instrumentality of institutions in economic activity, however. Institutions play a 
functional role in providing a basis for decision-making, expectation, and belief 
(Hodgson 1988:205). More broadly, institutions “structure” inter-relations: they 
enable individuals to understand what other individuals are doing, are expected to do, 
and what may and may not be done. Institutions are “social relations” that frame the 
activities of production, consumption, and exchange (Setterfield 1993:756); the 
substance rather than merely the boundaries of social life (Hodgson 1988:134); and 
the guide to reduce uncertainty in human interactions (North 1990:3-4). As such, 
institutions operate at and through different arenas that may be grouped into levels of 
inter-relation, scales of governance, and systems (table 1). 
There is broad agreement among institutionalists that as a process the economy is 
“instituted” (Polanyi 1957) over time through social relations in a co-evolving cultural 
context. For institutionalists key to understanding the processes of growth and change 
are the institutions of the economy, as well as individual preferences. But 
understanding institutions requires appreciation of complexity, continuity, and 
evolution in historical time. The task requires carefully organized categories that 
reveal the levels, scales, and systems around and through which institutions are woven 
(table 1). Institutions define inter-relations at the social, organizational, and societal 
 6
levels; are context-specific and operate at, through, and across different scales of 
governance; and structure what occurs in social, economic, and political systems.  
Context specificity may also manifest itself as path dependency, cumulative 
causation, and lock-in (Hodgson 1994). Path dependency may be described as 
“dependence on initial conditions” (after Arthur 1990), or a recurring emergence of 
initial conditions, resulting in relative permanency (Hodgson 1988, 1993, 1999a) of 
particular habits / customs and institutional forms. Cumulative causation is closely 
associated with the better-known economic concept, the “multiplier effect”. 
Cumulative causation is thus defined as the unfolding of events connected with a 
change in the economy (Myrdal 1957) due to the appearance of a new enterprise 
which may be private, e.g., a factory, or public, e.g., a government institution or a 
public-private partnership. Lock-in and its relationship with path dependency and 
cumulative causation are best captured through the oft-cited case of how the 
QWERTY keyboard arrangement, despite proven inferiority to other key 
arrangements, evolved to become the standard in keyboard arrangement.  
Scott (2001:48) goes further than most in providing a view of institutions that 
captures the multi-dimensionality of institutions by describing them as resilient social 
structures composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements to 
bring order and stability to social life. In addition, institutions operate at multiple 
scales of jurisdiction and levels of interpersonal relationships to connote dynamic 
stability. We may deduce from Scott’s (2001) description that institutions collectively 
act as an integrated web running through different systems (e.g., social, economic), 
scales of governance (e.g., local, regional, national), and levels of embeddedness (e.g., 
individuals, organizations, societies). Three additional elements may be added to this 
mix. 
First, long-term institutional change is path dependent and derived from the 
economy’s specific adjustment path toward certain institutions (Setterfield 1993, 
Hodgson 1999a). Second, institutional evolution is shaped by the feedback process by 
which human beings perceive and react to changes in their environment, through what 
North (1993) calls “shared mental models”. Third, institutional evolution is the 
product of the symbiotic relationship between institutions and organizations (North 
1990:7) in a process best described as a continuum and denoted as “cause-effect-
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cause”. We may also add that institutions are at once persistent, resistant to change, 
but capable of changing in evolutionary time, and transmitted through various means 
to consecutive generations to provide a certain degree of continuity, stability, 
predictability, and security. Because institutions are manifest in all spheres of socio-
economic life, and by most accounts play important roles in facilitating and curtailing 
change, there is a need for meaningful categorization so as to make analysis of 
institutions possible where they are manifest and not as a grey box appearing in 
schematics of socio-economic change. In the next section a typology of institutions is 
presented to allow such categorization.  
4. A Typology of Institutions 
Given this “key variable” status of institutions in economic analysis it is crucial that 
the properties of the variable, and the role(s) expected of it, are defined and 
articulated. This of course is no simple task. What is presented in the next few 
sections is far from the final word on institutions and institutional analysis. It is rather 
an attempt to bring structure and a common language to a fundamental yet poorly 
defined aspect of socio-economic enquiry. In the next section five “types” of 
institution are identified to provide a loose but necessary structure for institutional 
analysis. The typology is used in subsequent sections to examine technological 
change in the European Global System for Mobile Telecommunication industry. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the role of institutions in technological “transitions”. 
Institutions are made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources (Scott 2001) to define the structure for interactions among humans based on 
rules, norms, and values. Institutions may appear as organizations, cultural 
phenomena, or structures sharing important commonalities as depicted in table 2. All 
institutions may be viewed variously as production systems, enabling structures, 
social programmes, or performance scripts depicting stable designs for chronically 
repeated activity sequences (Jepperson 1991:144-5). As such, institutions are 
produced, modified, and/or reproduced by human behaviour (Scott 2001). The 
“permanency” or durability of institutions is only relative as institutions continuously 
undergo change due to societal dynamics and entropy, or a tendency toward disorder 
or disorganization (Zucker 1988:26) and a subsequent reorganization to produce new 
or modified institutions. To illustrate, an associative institution can transform, 
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overtime and under certain circumstances, into a regulative or constitutive institution 
if it is able to reinvent or reposition itself in response to changes and opportunities in 
the total system. According to the typology in table 2, such transformation redefines 
the roles of the institution and makes the institution a more integrated and stable part 
of the socio-economy. 
Table 2 expands on Scott’s (2001:48) “pillars” of institutions to introduce five types 
of institution. Grouping institutions in the manner indicated in table 2 can provide 
clues on how institutions are manifested at different levels, systems, and scales. The 
right hand column provides descriptions and examples of these institution types. 
Institution may be “associative”, in that they comprise socio-political structures 
characterized by exclusion, socialization, controlling conditions of incumbency, and 
hero worship to express certain values or interests. Associative institutions are 
reproduced by succeeding generations of power holders to exercise a degree of 
selectivity.2 Second, institutions may be “behavioural” in that they are transmitted by 
various carriers, including symbolic and relational systems, routines, and artefacts.3 
Third, institutions may be “cognitive” in that they are based on values and embedded 
in culture.4 Fourth, institutions may be “regulative” in that they provide stability and 
give meaning to social life.5 Fifth, institutions may be “constitutive” in that they are 
social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience and operate at multiple 
scales of jurisdiction.6 
TABLE 2 
There are in addition numerous “hybrid” descriptions of institutions consisting of two 
or more of the types identified in table 2. For example, Setterfield (1993:761) defines 
institutions as “exogenous constraints” (regulative) which in time become endogenous 
to the working of the economy and the actions of individuals (behavioural). Scott 
(2001:52) also refers to institutions as “regulatory processes” to establish rules, 
inspect others’ conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions. The 
                                                 
2 Based on Stinchcombe (1968:107-111). See also Parsons (1940:190) and Scott (2001:55). 
3 See Durkheim (1950), Mitchell (1950:373), Neale (1994:404), and Veblen (1919:239). 
4 See Douglas (1982:12), Neale (1987:1184), and Scott (2001:57-58). 
5 See Bush (1986), Elster (1989), Hayden (1993:309), Hodgson (1988:205), Hughes (1939:297), North 
(1990:4), Parsons (1990:327), Rutherford (1994:182), Scott (2001:34,50-54), Setterfield 
(1993:756,761), Thelen and Steinmo (1992:2), and Tool (1993:132). 
6 See Commons (1924), Cooley (1956), Giddens (1984:13), Hodgson (1988:134,153), Neale 
(1987:1180, 1994:404), North (1990:3-4,28,61,69), Scott (2001:75,95). 
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internalization of various institutions by individuals and groups of individuals can be 
cause for inertia or resistance to change. Hughes (1939) viewed institutions as 
behavioural and regulative in that they determine individual or group action according 
to a set of mores and/or formal rules. Similar views are expressed by Neale (1987) 
and Hayden (1993). According to Rutherford (1994:182) institutions are at once 
regulative and constitutive in that they denote regularity in behaviour by individuals at 
large and by individuals within an organization. An organization is in turn subjected 
to external (social) regularities which are constituted at higher scales of governance.7 
Conducting institutional analysis in the manner implied in table 2 requires 
specification of the level(s), scale(s), and the system(s) through which institutions are 
being studied. For example, phenomena at the national scale of governance occur in 
relation to factors at higher and lower scales. Institutional analysis of a national 
phenomenon would recognize but not conduct in-depth analysis of the local or 
continental scales. Taking a multi-level, multi-system, and multi-scale perspective on 
institutions as suggested here increases the need for the articulation of the research 
question and of the analytical approach adopted. Articulation and specification enable 
us to go beyond merely describing institutions collectively as an important factor to 
consider. This articulation further allows research to focus on the key institutions in a 
given situation and avoids “analysis-paralysis” that may result from being overly 
concerned with the importance of complexity and the need to remain holistic. 
The structure suggested in table 2 is best used in conjunction with Neale’s (1987) 
method for identifying through recognition, rather than defining, institutions. 
Components of institutions are manifested as activities of people in situations and in 
contexts. Observation and characterization of these components allow operational 
recognition, not definition, of institutions. There are three characteristics that allow 
institution identification: “First, there are a number of people doing. Second, there are 
rules giving the activities repetition, stability, predictable order. Third, there are 
folkviews – most certainly what Walton Hamilton meant by a ‘bundle of intellectual 
usages’ – explaining or justifying the activities and the rules”8 (Neale 1987:1182). 
                                                 
7 For a fuller discussion of institutions see Parto (2003). 
8 “Folkviews explain or justify the rules to the people of a society, often explaining and justifying 
simultaneously. Folkviews include values, but equally they include the ideas that people have about the 
universe around them – physical, chemical and biological, as well as social; and the mystical and 
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“Doing” can be seen and thus identified; “rules” can be identified by “ordering the 
doings into repetitive event sequences”; and the “folkviews justify the activities or 
explain why they are going on, how they are related, what is important and what is 
unimportant in the patterns of regularity. Folkviews can be discovered by observation, 
but here the eye is a minor instrument and the ear is a major one” (Neale 1987:1183).  
When we speak of something as being “instituted” we at once allude to something 
that has been “learned” and adopted by individuals, singly or in groups, which affects 
inter-relations at all levels; something by which individuals or groups of individuals 
may be characterized at different scales; and perhaps most importantly, something 
that reveals a degree of relative permanency as manifested in habits, customs, and so 
forth within or across systems. Depending on the purpose of the analysis some levels, 
scales, or systems need to be more, or less, emphasized than others since not 
everything is equally important in all situations and all the time. 
Institutionalization processes are closely associated with processes of learning and 
unlearning. (Un)Learning entails change of values. The rate at which value change 
occurs is directly dependent on the belief system in which the specific values reside. 
Deeply held values are much slower to change, if at all, while tactical values may 
change rapidly in response to exogenous pressures. Belief system values and learning 
are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
5. Learning and Belief System Values 9 
The values that determine the behaviour of economic agents may be grouped under 
three belief systems. Primary belief system values span within and outside the 
subsystem and are the most difficult to change. Examples include religious or ethnic 
beliefs on fundamental issues such as human domination over nature or equity and 
equality. Secondary values are subsystem specific and concern the strategies for 
addressing a shared problem. Secondary values may be expressed as ideological 
positions on strategy and policy instruments, e.g., government regulation versus 
voluntary self-regulation, to address a shared problem. Tertiary values are associated 
with the technical and administrative parts of the subsystem that hosting the problem. 
                                                                                                                                            
transcendent as well as the worldly…. [Folkviews] also include all the organizing and directing ideas 
of a culture or subculture” (Neale 1994:403) 
9 This section has benefited from various exchanges with Andreas Reinstaller. 
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That is, tertiary values are concerned with how strategies are implemented. As such 
tertiary values are continually tested, debated, and thus prone to change more easily 
and frequently than primary and secondary belief system values.10 Changes in the 
primary, secondary, and tertiary values are directly traceable to changes in different 
types of institution as defined in table 2. 
To illustrate, knowledge accumulated through the trials and errors of policy 
implementation to address groundwater contamination continually presents the 
subsystem actors, i.e., those concerned and willing to take action on groundwater 
contamination, with opportunities to learn, debate, and potentially change opinions. A 
change of approach in policy implementation based on new learning represents a 
tertiary value change and may affect secondary values. The secondary values may 
change in response to learning that self-regulation by industry to protect groundwater 
does not in fact work and is prone to abuse by free-riders, for example. A change in 
the secondary values within the subsystem may be to agree to constrain water-
polluting activities through legislation. Such a constraint does not question the 
supremacy of the market or put environmental protection before economic gain. Over 
sufficiently long periods of time and accompanied with technological advances, 
secondary value changes could be reversed in light of new information and raise 
questions about deeply held beliefs (primary values) such as the legitimacy of human 
domination over the natural environment.  
The primary belief system values are closely associated with constitutive institutions, 
but also find expression in regulative, cognitive, behavioural, and associative 
institutions. The primary values form the basis for understanding and interpreting the 
states of the world. The process of understanding is a process of evaluation based on 
the fundamental axioms of socio-economic life as determined by such constitutive 
institutions as language or property rights, defining and setting the boundaries of 
social relations at different levels. The boundaries of social relation are established 
through routines and norms as behavioural institutions. The values attached to specific 
states of the world are identified and turned into constraints and guidelines of thought, 
                                                 
10 Primary, secondary, and tertiary belief system values are almost identical to Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith’s (1999) “deep core”, “policy core”, and “secondary aspects”, respectively. The definitions used 
here also draw on Ostrom’s (1999) “rules” (mutually understood shared prescriptions on must, must 
not, and may), “norms” (mutually enforced shared prescriptions), and “strategies” (regularized plans by 
individuals within the structure of incentives produced by rules, norms, and expectations of others).    
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becoming manifest as secondary belief system values as reflected in regulative 
institutions, e.g., rules and regulations, and cognitive institutions, e.g., cultural and 
social values. Secondary values determine the basic strategies for choosing, 
assembling, or modifying operative routines and generate tertiary values that decide 
which technical or administrative tools are selected for the operationalizaton of 
selected strategies.  
A transition to a new technological regime is intimately linked with processes of 
learning / “unlearning” and the associated institutional change. In the case of the 
European mobile telecommunication subsystem the task then is to establish i) what 
changes over time and in which primary, secondary, and tertiary values preceded the 
shifts in the technological regime, and ii) how the changes in the primary, secondary, 
and tertiary belief system values were reflected in institutional change as manifested 
and traced in the typology of institutions in table 2. 
6. Case Study: Adoption of the Global System for Mobile Telecommunication 
(GSM) 11 
Until the early 1980s the mobile telecommunication arena could be best described as 
a diverse arena consisting of numerous first generation telecommunication 
technologies and operators. This diversity limited international roaming and caused 
fragmentation in the equipment market. There was general recognition that the 
potential growth of the market could only be realized through higher degrees of 
coordination and standardization both in manufacturing technologies and 
telecommunication protocols. In 1982 Conférence Européenne des Administrations 
des Postes et Télécommunications (CEPT) formed a group with a mandate to devise 
mobile telecommunication standards. Perhaps due to the rapid growth of the market 
the European Commission became increasingly interested and moved to assume a 
more central position in the evolving arena. 
The Commission established the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) which by 1996 assumed all the functions of the group formed by CEPT. A 
Memorandum of Understanding drafted by the CEPT-appointed group in 1987 and 
                                                 
11 The section is largely a re-interpretation of the historical account and analysis provided in Hommen 
and Manninen (2003).  
 13
signed by 13 countries had been signed in 1996 by 167 regulators and operators from 
103 European and non-European countries. The migration of control over the process 
to institute a Global System for Mobile Telecommunications (GSM) from CEPT to 
ETSI was in effect a move upward in the scale of governance from national to 
continental and downward from national regulation to a negotiative framework 
involving operators, manufacturers, user groups, and research bodies to devise new all 
encompassing standards for mobile telecommunications. A direct outcome of the 
hand-over was the new authority by ETSI to create a whole family of compatible 
technological standards and pave the way for the advance and consolidation of GSM’s 
rapid domination of the European market. The failure of contending technologies such 
as D-AMPS and CDMA, both digital, to become established in Europe is largely 
related to the partitioning of the European market by ETSI through its family of 
standards. This partitioning contrasted with the segmented North American market 
which had not created a central regulatory / standard setting body such as ETSI but 
had relied instead on “voluntary” standards (table 3). 
TABLE 3 
The centralized authority of ETSI, formalized in the late 1980s to set standards for 
mobile telecommunication was accompanied with increased competition in the 
market due to liberalization, set in motion with the EC Green Paper (1987), and rapid 
advances in digital technology. The Green Paper also called for strong and concerted 
effort in the development of telecommunications standards for the internal market. 
These developments undermined a stable regime based on analogue communication 
technology to pave the way for transition to a new regime based on (GSM) digital 
technology. The new regime involved a greater number of actors and a much greater 
complexity in the relations among them. Private firms were now competing directly 
on an international market and faced greater risks and opportunities that necessitated 
forming strategic alliances with other firms and public actors such as universities and 
research institutes to bolster critical mass and knowledge base. 
ETSI’s creation is said to have been motivated by a concern about Europe’s 
competitiveness in telecommunications in light of the threat posed by US 
multinationals (Dang-Nguyen et al 1993). ETSI collaborated with equivalent US and 
Japanese standard setting counterparts to devise comparable standards and adopted an 
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open door policy insofar as interested parties within the EU were concerned. The 
membership consisted of national communications and postal service providers and 
manufacturers, public research organizations and new entrants into the mobile 
telecommunication service provision market. ETSI also emphasized extensive public 
enquiry and instituted rules and procedures for resolving disputes on such issues as 
roaming charges and intellectual property rights. Arguably, ETSI’s success in 
instituting GSM is attributable to a problem, i.e., threat of competition by US 
multinationals to “corner” the European market in a new technological environment, a 
policy of liberalization accompanied with centralized coordination and standards 
setting activities, and the political commitment to nurturing cohesion among the 
national economies of member states. The confluence of the problem, policy, and 
politics streams (Kingdon 1984) combined with a shift in the demand and supply 
patterns created a perhaps non-replicable window of opportunity to balance 
coordination / standardization with competition. 
In examining the statistics in table 3 the following observations can be made. First, 
without a doubt the global market for second generation mobile telecommunication 
technology has been fragmented with Europe and Africa being almost dominated by 
the GSM group of technologies. This may be due to the scale of governance at which 
attempts were made toward standardization and a transition to the second generation 
technological regime. Second, the expansion of the market in Europe for GSM related 
technologies was due to “spontaneous” shifts in the demand and supply patterns. 
Third, the segmentation occurred due to the confluence of a problem, politics, and 
policy to exploit a window of opportunity (proactively or reactively) through new 
forms and governance mechanisms. Fourth, there was covert planning by EU 
governments to keep out the competition while advocating market liberalization. 
 
On closer examination it appears that the demand and supply patterns did indeed shift, 
but not entirely spontaneously as numerous other, inter-related, factors were involved: 
• The EU took a determined step to induce the shifts in demand and supply in 
this sector because it believed in digital technology as a potential source of 
competitiveness that could kick-start the European economies, create jobs, and 
so forth. 
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• Measures taken for this inducement included taking over the functions of 
CEPT by instituting ETSI, increased diversity of actors involved in the 
standard setting process (operators, manufacturers, user groups, and research 
bodies). 
• An explicit goal for ETSI was to increase subscription rates within the EU and 
market penetration rates where they were lower than average. Demand was 
indeed induced through standardization and regulation to facilitate market 
penetration and increased subscription. But key is the role played by private 
actors, e.g., Ericsson, Nokia, in devising the new standards and regulations in 
collaboration with national and EU government agencies. 
• Because of this collaborative environment it was relatively easy for the private 
actors to communicate their structural needs, e.g. more computer science 
graduates and R&D knowledge from various sources, to the policy makers. 
One direct result of this arrangement was a relaxation of strict IPR laws 
through an obligatory licencing system.  
• Increased demand was matched in a timely fashion by private actors possibly 
because private actors were involved in inducing the demand for GSM in the 
first place. 
 
Certainly, these developments acted as, or led to the emergence of, catalysts that 
initiated a series of institutionalization processes. Using the typology in table 2 these 
catalysts maybe grouped according to the type of institution as the likely outcome of 
the institutionalization process initiated: 
• Associative Institutions: some business networks adjusted their functions to a 
new or emerging environment while other networks emerged to address new 
needs. Notable associative institutions included strategic alliances among 
private (and public-private) interests and the formation of CEPT (initiated by 
operators).  
• Behavioural Institutions: Owning a mobile phone became “necessary” due to 
convenience, limited access to far fewer public telephone boxes, and “hipness” 
of owning one. 
• Cognitive Institutions: Awareness campaigns, advertising 
• Regulative Institutions: Legislation, mediation between private and public 
interests (leading to standards and MoUs) 
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• Constitutive Institutions: The formation of ETSI as an evolution of CEPT, 
generation of standards and the Memorandum of Understanding. 
The evolution of GSM suggests that policy learning at higher scales often defines and 
determines the policy direction while implementation necessitates learning at the firm 
level accompanied with concurrent processes of institutionalization. The rate at which 
supra-local forms and routines based on new learning succeed in replacing or 
modifying local forms and routines is in part dependent on the collective strength at 
the local scale to contest, or embrace, the externally imposed forms and routines. 
Initiating the process of transition requires top-down regulation through a 
combination of coercion and sanction aimed at instituting new forms and routines, 
buy-in, and cooperation from the actors of the subsystem. Such cooperation often 
needs to be nurtured and developed from higher scales and based on increased trust in 
inter-relations among actors over relatively long periods of time. The fact that the 
subscription levels and market penetration were particularly high in some countries 
may indeed be largely due to context specificity: Nordic countries have long-
established “negotiated” economies where the historical tendency has been toward 
relative social peace and institutionalized class co-operation (Jessop 1997: 113) 
through making compromises. 
The key to the success of the negotiated economies has been the ability of the national 
states to combine orthodox corporatism (involving business associations, trade 
unions, and the national state) and a “model of concertation” involving “a wide range 
of extra-economic as well as economic forces… [consisting of] rural and urban petty 
bourgeois sectors, the local state and functional domains such as health, education, 
welfare and scientific research” (Jessop 1997: 113, 114-5). Negotiated economies are 
noted for their ability to bring together, and maintain over time, private and public 
interests in collaborative arrangements. One could speculate that the collaborative 
environment of the Nordic EU member states may have (inadvertently) served as a 
laboratory for the EU government agencies to experiment with establishing a 
technological niche in an emerging market. However, a more concrete and 
empirically valid argument about how and why the GSM group of technologies 
became dominant in Europe would have to be based on a research that pays particular 
attention to the institutions, as well as the agents, of economic change.   
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to examine the transition from an analogue (first generation) 
to a digital (second generation) telecommunication technological regime in Europe in 
an institutional context. A conceptual framework was devised to account for the 
collective role of institutions in facilitating this transition while some key events were 
underlined as catalysts for the emergence of new institutions. The simultaneous 
learning and unlearning processes associated with this transition were found to be 
most pronounced at the firm and policy levels.12 
However, the analysis of the secondary data also reveals that (un)learning does not 
occur in a vacuum but is a process initiated by a window of opportunity resulting 
from a confluence of a widely recognized problem (threat of competition), political 
convictions (for a cohesive European Community and a liberalized European market), 
policies (to pursue cohesion and competitiveness), and most importantly an 
evolutionary shift in the demand and supply patterns. Early in the learning process 
that ensued after this confluence was the realization that the knowledge base could be, 
and had to be, significantly enriched by involving a diverse group of actors to devise 
the new standards for mobile telecommunication. Public research organizations and 
major telecommunication equipment firms began to play central roles in ETSI while 
key actors like Ericsson began a process of competence building through corporate 
restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, significant increases in 
research and development, and upgrading internal skills base. 
Institutional analysis of the evolution of particular domains or subsystems needs to 
accomplish three main tasks. First, the analysis must be aimed at understanding 
“why” phenomena occurred. Specifically, the enquiry must be “what type of 
institution, through what scale(s) of governance, and operating at what level(s) of 
inter-relation are responsible for the observed change”?  Second, the analysis needs to 
identify the causal relationships between some of the main catalysts, and the 
institutionalization processes initiated by them to contextualize the emergence of new 
or modified institution types (table 2). Third, for policy purposes the analysis needs to 
establish the controllability of the catalysts and determine which can be manipulated 
and which is independent. The analysis should also reveal the institutionalization 
                                                 
12 This conclusion is based on a review of the secondary data in Hommen and Manninen (2003). 
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processes that may be initiated through intervention to complement, i.e., soften the 
full effect or boost, independent processes. 
 
An institutionalist approach to policy making is agenda based (Hayden 1993) and 
should first establish what institutions there are and how they are inter-related. The 
approach also needs to establish whether the missing institutions or inter-relations 
could be realistically compensated for, all things considered. The information 
gathered through this exercise could then be used to (attempt to) facilitate change in 
an overt manner toward universally legitimate goals such as establishing desirable 
technologies, fighting global warming, or striving for sustainability in the broadest 
sense.  
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Table 1. Institutional Arenas 
Levels of 
inter-relation * 
 
Individual: Among individuals at large based on interpersonal 
interdependence where many actors are involved. 
Organizational: Within organizations to secure internal cohesion and 
among organizations to maximize adaptability of individual organizations 
so as to make compatible respective operational unities and independence 
with de facto material and social interdependence on other organizations. 
Societal: Among operationally autonomous (or closed) functional systems 
each with its own autopoietic*** codes, programmes, institutional logics and 
interests in self-reproduction. 
 
Scales of 
governance ** 
Local (subnational), national, international (between nationally constituted, 
functionally differentiated institutional orders), transnational (passing 
through national boundaries), and global (covering the globe as a whole). 
 
Systems  
The whole (Earth-based) system consists of numerous subsystems such as 
social, economic, political, and ecological. Subsystems may be composite 
and made up parts from two or more subsystems. 
* Adapted from Jessop (1997)  
** Adapted from Mann (1996) and Jessop (1997)  
*** Jessop (1997:102) defines “autopoiesis” as a condition of radical autonomy secured through self-
organization when a system defines its own boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own 
operational code, implements its own programmes, reproduces its own elements in a closed circuit and 
obeys its own laws. 
Source: Parto (2003) 
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Table 2. Levels, Systems, and Scales of Institutions 
Institution Type Level System(s) Scale Examples / 
Catalysts 
Associative: Institutions as 
mechanisms facilitating 
prescribed or privileged 
interaction among different 
private and public interests 
Inter- and Intra- 
Organizational, 
Institutional 
Economic, 
Social Political 
All † Business Networks; Kinship 
Groups; Social Classes; 
Associations; Interest 
Groups 
Behavioural: Institutions as 
standardized (recognizable) 
social habits – manifested in 
activities of individuals and 
groups as reflections of 
social norms 
Individuals) Economic, 
Social Cultural 
Local, Regional, 
National †† 
Habits; Routines; Artefacts; 
Ways of Doing Things; 
Shared Beliefs; Theories in 
Use; “How the Game is 
Played” 
Cognitive: Institutions as 
mental models and 
constructs or definitions – 
manifested primarily in 
what society expects of 
individuals 
Individual, 
Societal 
Social, Cultural Local, Regional, 
National ≠  
Cultural and Social Values; 
Superstitions; “Wisdom”; 
“How the Game Ought to be 
Played” 
Regulative: Institutions as 
prescriptions and 
proscriptions  
Individual, 
Inter-
organizational, 
Societal 
Economic, 
Social, Political 
Local, Regional, 
National, 
Continental ≠≠ 
Written and Unwritten 
“Rules of the Game”; State 
as Rule Maker, Referee, and 
Enforcer  
Constitutive: Institutions 
setting the bounds of social 
relations  
Individual, 
Inter-
organizational, 
Societal 
Economic, 
Social, Political 
Regional, 
National, 
Continental, 
Global 
Collective Actions initiated 
by the State Agencies, Firms, 
Unions, or Citizens Groups; 
Language; Property Rights 
Structures; Agreements; 
Arrangements; Marriage; 
Family 
† Associative institutions are present at all scales from local to global. 
††Generally, there is a higher degree of heterogeneity at higher scales. The rationale for including the national scale here 
is that individuals in a nation are “regulated” by the same formal rules and political system.  
≠ Superstitions and social values, though sometimes shared by other nations, are nevertheless likely to be “diluted” 
beyond the national scale.  
≠≠The number and influence of institutions are inversely related to scale. 
Adapted from Parto (2003) 
 
 
Table 3. Market segmentation and second generation mobile telecommunication 
technologies 
Technology Europe N. America L. America Asia Africa 
GSM 89% 4% 1% 35% 88% 
D-AMPS - 27% 39% 3% - 
CDMA - 9% 9% 14% - 
Analogue 11% 60% 51% 48% 12% 
Source: ITU World Communications Database (2002) 
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